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1. Introduction 
The growing demand for high-speed Internet services has induced the world’s leading 
telecommunications operators to deploy next generation access (NGA) networks
1
. 
Despite taking this step, the extraordinary cost of these infrastructures may result in a 
large part of the population being left without access to high-speed Internet, and this 
has given rise to growing concerns about the potential impact this dual evolution of 
the market may have in terms of territorial and social cohesion.  
In the European Union (EU), recognition of this problem led to the adoption of the 
Digital Agenda for Europe in 2010, whereby the Union committed itself to ensuring 
that by 2020 there should be universal coverage of networks that support broadband 
speeds greater than 30 Mbps and that half of all European households would subscribe 
to connections over 100 Mbps. In September 2016, this objective was further 
extended so as to ensure that by 2025 all European households should enjoy access to 
connectivity offering at least 100 Mbps
2
. As a direct result of this, European regulators 
have introduced modifications to sector legislation in an attempt at reaching these 
objectives. However, the measures adopted in recent years are not easily evaluated 
given the absence of studies examining the factors that might influence the operators’ 
investment decisions. This paper seeks to fill this gap by analyzing the fiber-to-the-
home (FTTH) deployment made by Telefónica in Spain between 2010 and 2013, a 
period in which the incumbent operator was the first and only company to invest in 
this technology in the country.  
An essential aspect in understanding the operators’ investment in NGA is determining 
just how their decisions are affected by the regulation of access to the incumbent’s 
legacy network and to the NGA networks. Following the liberalization of the 
telecommunications sector in the mid-nineties, the difficulties encountered in 
persuading new entrants to invest outside the most profitable metropolitan areas of 
European cities led the European Commission to initiate local loop unbundling (LLU). 
By so doing, the entrants were able to install their equipment in the incumbent’s 
                                                          
1
 There are three types of NGA broadband: VDSL over copper (with a network topology known as 
FTTN/FTTC), FTTP (which comprises both fiber to the home – FTTH - and fiber to the building - FTTB) and 
coaxial cable networks upgraded by the standard DOCSIS 3.0. The transmission capacity and speed of all 
these networks is less influenced by distance than it is in copper networks. The difference between fiber 
networks depends on the distance between the fiber end and the consumer’s premises. For example, in 
Spain, Italy, Portugal and France, the fiber reaches the customer’s home (FTTH), whilst in the UK, 
Germany and France it reaches a street cabinet (FTTC) from which a copper cable provides access.  
2
 The European Commissions’ (EC) Communication “Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market 
- Towards a European Gigabit Society” states that by 2025, symmetrical connectivity must be provided 
at 1 Gigabit per second in strategic locations (public infrastructure and industrial areas), that there 
should be complete 5G coverage in urban centers and on main transport routes, and that all households 
should have Internet at speeds of at least 100 Mbps. In addition, the EC proposes a reform of the 
regulatory framework for electronic communications and suggests the creation of a European 
Broadband Fund.  
4 
 
switching facilities at a regulated wholesale price and to use the incumbent’s terminal 
copper line to access the clients’ premises. The introduction of LLU has meant that 
entrants can offer a differentiated service from that provided by the incumbent, and 
so gradually they have been able to erode its market share. In Europe, LLU regulation 
was justified on the grounds of the so-called ladder-of-investment, which considers 
that by providing entrants with different access options (e.g. local loop unbundling, 
bitstream and resale), they have incentives for the gradual increase in infrastructure 
investment
3
.  
In line with this legacy-based infrastructure regulation, the European Commission 
considers that multilevel access to the NGA infrastructure of operators that enjoy 
significant market power may promote greater investment efforts by entrants. As a 
consequence, it has recommended an extension of its traditional access policy to the 
new networks. In recent years, various EU countries (including Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden) have introduced regulations on NGA 
wholesale access, while others have chosen not to regulate this wholesale service 
(France and Portugal)
 4
. Despite this, there is very little evidence as to how operators 
are reacting to these regulatory strategies. 
The theoretical literature has examined several regulatory frameworks that can be 
used to promote investment in NGA networks. Some papers have analyzed the 
relation between copper and fiber access regulations and their impact on the 
migration from old to new networks (Bourreau et al., 2012; Bourreau et al., 2014; 
Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011; Briglauer and Vogelsang, 2011; Brito et al., 2010; Inderst 
and Peitz, 2014). For example, Bourreau et al., (2012) identified three effects that can 
influence operators’ incentives to invest: (1) a replacement effect: if the legacy access 
charge is high, entrants accelerate their investment in the new infrastructure; (2) a 
wholesale revenue effect: if the incumbent invests in a higher quality network, it loses 
some wholesale profits; and (3) a business migration effect: when the access price to 
the legacy network is low, the prices for the services that rely on this network are also 
low. Hence, in order to encourage customers to switch from old to new technology, 
the operators deploying new networks have to differentiate their services. Overall, this 
stream of literature considers that NGA investments can reduce the revenues obtained 
with the legacy infrastructure, which might reduce the incentive to invest in new 
networks. Similarly, extending the access regulations to the new infrastructure may 
negatively affect the profitability of fiber deployment.  
In Spain, in the period analyzed, Telefónica (the former monopoly) was the first and 
only operator to deploy fiber. Although initially the wholesale service of this new 
                                                          
3
 In the US, by contrast, in 2005 the regulator eliminated most elements of the unbundling regime, 
considering that the existence of an almost nationwide duopoly was enough to generate competition 
(Briglauer et al., 2014; Vogelsang, 2015). 
4
  See BEREC, 2016. 
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technology was not regulated, Telefónica was required to provide other operators with 
access to its ducts and civil infrastructure. In contrast, entrants could access 
Telefónica’s legacy copper network via different wholesale services: LLU and bitstream. 
Against this backdrop, our empirical model analyzes how LLU and bitstream 
competition at the municipality level influenced Telefónica’s fiber deployment.  
Similarly, during the period of analysis, cable operators held a strong presence in 
certain Spanish regions, their networks being deployed between 1995 and 2000. 
Moreover, once Telefónica initiated its FTTH roll-out, cable operators had already 
upgraded their networks, so that they could support very high speeds. Taking this into 
account, our paper also considers the impact of existing cable competition in a 
municipality on Telefónica’s investment decisions. Finally, we also examine how local 
socioeconomic characteristics determined investment decisions.  
We use panel data on the incumbent operator’s FTTH deployment in 6,063 Spanish 
municipalities with broadband from the first semester of 2010 to the first semester of 
2013. Our results show that the regulation of access to Telefónica’s network was a key 
determinant in the operator’s investment strategy. While LLU competition had a 
strong positive impact on Telefónica’s fiber deployment, bitstream competition had a 
negative effect. In this regard, it should be stressed that LLU operators had been 
Telefónica’s fiercest competitors since market liberalization in 1998, and in those years 
managed to attract a large share of the incumbent’s consumers. By deploying fiber in 
areas where LLU entry had been intense, Telefónica was able to differentiate its offer 
and appropriate some profits from its investment in NGA. Moreover, as the LLU 
wholesale price was low, the wholesale revenues foregone by investing in fiber were 
relatively small. By contrast, in areas where bitstream entry had been comparatively 
more prevalent, Telefónica showed less interest in deploying fiber. Finally, our results 
show some evidence of a positive relationship between the cable operators’ market 
share and Telefónica’s investments.  
Our study of the sociodemographic characteristics of the municipalities reveals that 
market size, measured by the number of households and premises in the municipality, 
had a positive effect on the odds of fiber deployment. Similarly, the density of the 
population had a positive and significant effect. Finally, the level of unemployment and 
the percentage of elderly population in the municipality presented a negative impact. 
These results suggest that in addition to the competition variables, local market 
characteristics were an essential factor in determining Telefónica’s investment 
strategy. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the empirical 
literature on NGA investments. Section 3 explains the main characteristics of the 
Spanish market. Section 4 describes the data set. Section 5 explains the empirical 
strategy. Section 6 presents the results. And, finally, Section 7 concludes.   
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2. Review of the empirical literature 
Studies of the determinants of NGA investment are scarce. A number of papers have 
analyzed LLU and next generation network (NGN) investments by drawing on data at 
the national level
5
. Most of these examine the validity of the ladder-of-investment 
approach, the strategy that regulates access to the incumbent operator’s 
infrastructure (bitstream and LLU) so as to create service-based competition and 
promote facility-based competition in the long run
6
. Bacache et al. (2014) examine 
migration from old to new broadband infrastructure in 15 European Member States 
between 2002 and 2010, and show that unbundling regulations did not provide 
entrants with any incentives to invest in NGA. Briglauer (2015) and Briglauer et al., 
(2013, 2016) analyzed how the regulation of the old legacy network affected NGA 
adoption and coverage in 27 European Member States. Briglauer et al., (2016) show 
that, in the period 2004-2014, the higher access prices imposed on the old legacy 
infrastructure positively increased NGN investment and adoption, and reduced the gap 
in the retail prices of old and new technology-based broadband services. Grajek and 
Roller (2012) examined 70 operators in 20 European countries in the period 1996-2006 
and show that access regulations lowered total industry and individual firms’ 
investments. 
A few papers have analyzed market entry in relation to unbundling regulations in the 
telecommunications market using data at the municipal level. First, a handful analyzed 
entry in the US telecommunications market prior to 2004, when the regulator 
removed unbundling obligations on fiber-optic premises so as to foster infrastructure 
competition and promote investment. For example, Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006) 
show that network element unbundling extended the variety of entrant operators 
after the 1996 Telecommunications Act, while Economides et al. (2008) found that the 
service-based competition promoted by unbundling reduced prices and increased 
service quality. Xiao and Orazem (2009), drawing on data at the zip code level in the US 
from 1999 to 2004, show that the first potential group of entrants in a local market 
may significantly delay their entry decision when facing the threat of additional 
entrants from neighboring markets. As a result, the first broadband providers, which 
do not face this entry threat, enjoy a certain degree of market power.  
Second, Prieger et al., (2015) analyzed quality competition among internet service 
providers in California between 2011 and 2013. They examined how incumbent ADSL 
                                                          
5
 Another strand in the literature uses aggregate country-level data to analyze broadband diffusion. 
Some papers discuss the relevance of inter- and intra-platform competition (Distaso et al., 2006; Lee and 
Brown, 2008; Bouckaert et al., 2010; Gruber and Koutroumpis, 2013; Briglauer, 2014; Ovington et al., 
2017). Others use microdata to analyze broadband diffusion (Dauvin and Grzybowski, 2014; Nardotto et 
al., 2015). 
6
 Previous analyses of this approach can be found in Hazlett and Bazelon (2005) and Hausman and Sidak 
(2005). 
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firms respond to competition from entrant local exchange carriers and cable modem 
service providers. The paper shows that the firms’ responses are heterogeneous to the 
type of provider and to the quality they offer. Incumbent local exchange carriers 
(ILECs) improved the quality of their ADSL offer when a cable operator entered the 
market, or when the incumbent cable operator improved its networks with DOCSIS 
3.0. Yet, ILECs did not raise their ADSL service quality when competitive local exchange 
carriers (CLECs) only offered ADSL; however, they increased their speed when CLECs 
deployed fiber in the local market. 
Third, Nardotto et al., (2015) examined LLU entry at the local exchange level in the 
United Kingdom in the period 2005-2009. They show that larger markets support a 
greater number of entrants, which confirms the importance of high fixed investment 
costs. Moreover, they find that entry is highly persistent over time, which implies that 
the technology is associated with substantial sunk costs. The authors then use the 
results of the entry model to study the determinants of broadband penetration and 
conclude that while LLU entry contributed to an increase in broadband penetration at 
the beginning of the period, cable competition had a greater impact at the end of the 
period. Their paper also shows that entrants invested in LLU in order to differentiate 
their services from those of the incumbent. 
Our paper is closely related to recent studies that use microdata to examine the effects 
of unbundling on investment in NGA. Minamihashi (2012) analyzes the impact that the 
unbundling regulations imposed on the Japanese incumbent had on the entrants’ NGN 
investments. Using municipal level data from 2005 to 2009, he shows that unbundling 
reduced the profits of cable television operators and prevented them from building 
their own fiber networks. In contrast, in the period analyzed, the incumbent’s NGN 
investments were unaffected by this regulation. Fabritz and Falck (2013) use a panel 
dataset for exchange areas in the UK to analyze how local deregulation of wholesale 
broadband access affected investment. They find that in the deregulated areas local 
exchanges experienced a significant increase in the entry of LLU operators. Moreover, 
deregulation in these areas also increased the probability of the incumbent rolling out 
its FTTC infrastructure. 
Finally, the paper that is closer to ours is Bourreau et al., (2017). Their study analyzes 
the incentives of French operators to deploy FTTH technology in different areas of the 
country. They use a detailed geographical dataset with information on the number of 
LLU competitors and the number of operators deploying fiber in 36,066 municipalities 
of France over the period 2010-2014. One important difference between this paper 
and ours is that, in the period analyzed, two entrants – SFR and Free – and the 
incumbent operator – Orange – simultaneously deployed their fiber networks. The 
situation described introduces a level of complexity in the strategies of the French 
operators that we do not encounter for the Spanish case where only Telefónica 
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invested. The authors conclude that the presence of LLU operators in local markets 
had a positive impact on the entry of the three fiber operators. On the one hand, SFR 
and Free always entered a local market via LLU first; on the other, investment by the 
three fiber operators was positively influenced by the presence of alternative LLU 
operators. The deployment of fiber enabled these operators to differentiate their offer 
from that of DSL-based services. The authors also show that the presence of cable 
operator Numericable’s upgraded facilities stimulated fiber deployment by the other 
operators.  
 
3. Broadband market and fiber deployment in Spain 
The deployment of fiber networks in Spain was initiated in 2008 when Telefónica 
began rolling out its FTTH network in densely populated areas of the country, such as 
Barcelona and Madrid. Initial fiber investments focused on the trunk network, but 
quickly spread to the periphery with the deployment of fiber nodes that shortened the 
distance between the home connection and the core of the network. Figure 1 shows 
the local exchanges with FTTH deployment and the distribution of unbundled loops at 
the municipal level in 2013. An initial inspection suggests that Telefónica’s deployment 
focused above all on highly populated areas and zones with a high penetration of 
unbundled local loops.  
 
Figure 1: FTTH central offices and LLU penetration in Spain (2013) 
 
           Source: CNMC 
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To roll out fiber to the customers’ homes, Telefónica used its civil works infrastructure: 
ducts, masts and other installations. Indeed, the availability of this civil infrastructure 
greatly favors FTTH investment, given that reaching the end customer is the most 
costly part of fiber roll-out
7
. In order to facilitate fiber roll-out, in 2009 the Spanish 
regulator (CNMC) obliged Telefónica to provide other operators with access to its 
ducts and civil infrastructure and applied a cost-oriented pricing system. This measure 
was taken to provide incentives for entrants to install their own fiber networks by 
using the incumbent’s infrastructure. However, in the period analyzed no entrant took 
advantage of this possibility.   
In order to deploy its fiber, Telefónica initially upgraded a number of local exchanges in 
the copper network, renamed FTTH central offices. Each one of these offices serves a 
much larger area than that served by a copper local exchange and requires fewer 
connections. This, coupled with the fact that the operating costs of fiber networks are 
lower than those of copper networks, provides an additional motivation for network 
replacement. By 2013, Telefónica’s FTTH network comprised 283 FTTH central offices, 
capable of providing broadband services to an area that had previously been served by 
636 copper local exchanges. The investment process was intense and in June of 2013, 
the last period available in our data set, 3.1% of Spanish municipalities (49.7% of the 
population) had access to FTTH technology. This figure is higher than that reported one 
year later for France, where coverage reached 1.6% (Bourreau et al., 2017).  
In the period 2009-2013, the Spanish broadband market underwent considerable 
expansion, growing from 9.1 million lines at the end of 2008 to 12.2 million lines in 
2013. xDSL and cable technologies were the main technologies provided and they 
supported approximately 95% of retail broadband lines. In contrast, while in 2008 no 
FTTH connections had yet been installed, by December 2013 there were 626,000 lines 
in operation (that is, 5% of the total number of broadband lines).  Other technologies 
(such as WiMAX) enjoyed very small market penetration.  
In the period analyzed, regulatory obligations to provide wholesale fiber services had 
not yet been established in Spain; indeed, it was not until February 2016 that they 
would be introduced. During the period of analysis, wholesale bitstream services were 
capped at 30 Mbps and Telefónica’s xDSL competitors’ wholesale services were 
dependent on the legacy network: LLU and bitstream services. 
Cable broadband was provided via proprietary networks that were built in the late 90s 
and which have not been expanded since. By 2010, these networks had been updated 
to the DOCSIS 3.0 standard and, therefore, during the period of analysis, cable 
operators were able to market high speed offers similar to those provided by FTTH. 
                                                          
7
 According to BEREC (2016), civil infrastructure works can constitute up to 70-80% of the cost of 
deploying this technology.  
10 
 
 
Figure 2: Broadband market shares by access mode in Spain (percentages) 
 
 
              Source: CNMC 
 
Figure 2 shows that between 2008 and 2013 there was a substantial increase in the 
market share of operators providing LLU services, at the expense of Telefónica and of 
the cable operators using proprietary networks. This can be explained in part by the 
differences in the prices charged by the operators. According to CNMC’s annual 
reports, in this period the retail prices set by LLU operators were significantly lower 
than those of Telefónica and the cable operators. Moreover, LLU prices were 
considerably lower than those of bitstream, reflecting substantial differences in their 
respective wholesale tariffs (for example, in 2009, monthly rental of the local loop was 
fixed at 7.79 euros, whilst the main bitstream modalities costed around 16 euros per 
month).  
  
4. Data 
We examine Telefónica’s deployment strategy using a semi-annual balanced panel 
dataset for the operator’s FTTH deployment in 6,063 Spanish municipalities from the 
first semester of 2010 to the first semester of 2013 (a total of seven time periods). As 
explained above, during the period examined Telefónica was the only operator 
undertaking FTTH investment activity of any relevance in Spain.  
The 6,063 municipalities included in the analysis had at least one fixed active 
broadband connection in 2010 provided by any one of Spain’s main telecom 
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operators
8
 and by means of xDSL (copper) or cable broadband technologies. In 2010 
these municipalities accounted for 99.2% of the Spanish population. 
Our analysis draws on a data set collected and compiled by the Comisión Nacional de 
los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC), the Spanish agency responsible for the 
economic regulation of the telecommunication sector. The database provides 
information on Telefónica‘s fiber deployment and on the number of broadband 
subscribers by technology and access mode in each local market (this is, xDSL and 
cable customers as well as the number of commercialized LLU and bitstream lines). 
When operators consider rolling out an NGA network in a new municipality, they take 
into account both the deployment costs and the expected revenues that the legacy 
and new technologies will generate. The latter depend on the market demographics 
and the presence and strength of their competitors. To analyze Telefónica’s 
investment decision, the main variable of interest here is Fiber deployment, capturing 
whether Telefónica has deployed FTTH in a municipality. This variable takes a value of 
1 when the operator has deployed at least one connection in the municipality and zero 
otherwise. 
We measure the competitive pressure that Telefónica faces at the municipal level by 
computing the cable, LLU and bitstream market shares. We exclude from the analysis 
other broadband technologies, including WiMAX, which are much less common in the 
Spanish market. The variables Cable, Local Loop (LLU) and Bitstream are included in 
the empirical models with a lag.   
The database is completed with municipal-level sociodemographic data from the 
Spanish National Statistical Office (INE) and the Spanish Public State Employment 
Service (SEPE). Specifically, we consider a group of variables that reflect the size of the 
market as well as the operators’ deployment costs at the municipality level. The 
variable Real estate units is the sum of households, premises and offices in the 
municipality and is included in the model in logs. Since this variable is only available for 
2011 and 2012, we impute its value for the other periods by using the closest time 
value. The variable population Density is introduced in the model in logs, and reflects 
the importance of density economies in Telefónica’s investment strategy. The density 
of population is related to the costs of fiber deployment as FTTH is more easily 
deployed in urban areas with tall buildings and with a wide availability of ducts (civil 
engineering and construction costs are lower in urban areas). Elderly population is the 
percentage of the population in the municipality aged 65 years old or more, and 
Unemployment is the percentage of the population aged 20 to 64 seeking a job 
according to the SEPE. This last variable is included in the models as a proxy of the 
consumers’ income and willingness to pay for the FTTH service.  
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 These were Telefónica, Vodafone, Jazztel, Orange, Ono, R, Telecable and Euskaltel. At the start of the 
period of analysis in 2010, these operators accounted for 97.5% of the national broadband market.  
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All the datasets were merged using a unique municipality INE code. Table 1 provides 
summary statistics for all the variables used in the empirical models.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (all periods) 
  
Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation  
Min Max 
Fiber deployment 42,441 0.022 0.146 0 1 
LLU 42,441 0.048 0.111 0 0.673 
Bitstream 42,441 0.123 0.081 0 0.569 
Cable 42,441 0.031 0.112 0 0.872 
Unemployment 42,441 0.118 0.058 0 0.585 
Elderly population 42,441 0.250 0.103 0.034 0.744 
Real estate units 42,441 4,695.701 31,737.430 17 1,861,334 
Density 42,441 232.087 1,029.198 0.380 24,705.240 
 
 
5. Empirical strategy  
 
Our model of Telefónica’s FTTH deployment in a municipality is based on Bresnahan-
Reiss (1991), where demand is stochastic and the incumbent’s decision to enter a 
municipality or not depends on whether the profits from entry exceed their costs. In 
our case, entry costs are mainly local and determined by the cost of deploying the 
fiber, which depends on such characteristics as the degree of urbanization and the 
urban planning rules operating in each municipality
9
. On the other hand, Telefónica’s 
profits from rolling out the new technology depend on the type of competition that it 
faces in each municipality. Taking this information into account, we identify the 
incumbent’s FTTH deployment strategy by fitting logit regression models for which the 
dependent variable is Fiber deployment. 
 
Several limitations of our balanced dataset preclude the use of a fixed effects model. 
One advantage of this estimation strategy is that it is not biased because of omitted 
time-invariant variables. However, it cannot be used to uncover time-invariant causes 
of the dependent variable and it cannot properly identify the coefficients of variables 
that do not vary significantly over time. Additionally, in the case of logit fixed effects 
models, the municipalities with a constant dependent variable over the follow-up 
period cannot be included in the analysis (Suárez and García-Mariñoso, 2013). 
Unfortunately, in our study, these two common drawbacks of a fixed effects approach 
                                                          
9
 Since we do not observe fiber exits, we are unable to identify sunk entry costs by comparing entry and 
exit thresholds, as in Bresnahan-Reiss (1994). A similar model has been used to examine LLU entry and 
exit decisions by Xiao and Orazem (2011) and Nardotto et al., (2015).   
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are present. First, the variation shown by our competition and sociodemographic 
explanatory variables over time is very limited due to the short study span. And 
second, as the overall rate of Telefónica FTTH deployment at the municipal level was 
low in the first semester of 2013, a logit fixed effects regression model would overlook 
more than 95% of the sample observations, thus dramatically reducing the power of 
the analysis.  
Therefore, we consider logit regressions with random effects.  This model can be 
expressed as follows:  
 
	 log	(
Pr	
, = 1		
,	, , 
]
1 − Pr	
, = 1		
,	, , 
]
) = 
,
  +
 
 
where, Y is the binary fiber deployment in municipality i at time t+1, X is the set of 
covariates measured at time t,   the associated coefficients to be estimated and 
  
the random effect following a normal distribution with mean equal to zero.  
To avoid potential endogeneities due to reverse causality all the covariates are lagged. 
Specifically, the competition variables (LLU, Bitstream and Cable) are lagged one 
period (six months) and the sociodemographic variables are lagged two periods (recall 
that half-year data are not available for these variables). Moreover, by lagging the 
covariates, we are “mimicking” the information set that Telefónica held when taking 
its strategic decisions of where to roll out FTTH, given that those were based on the 
latest information available before initiating deployment. A time variable is included in 
all the specifications to control for the increasing trend in FTTH deployment over time 
and an interaction between population density and the time trend is also used. 
Finally, to deal with potential municipality fixed specific effects, without relying on the 
within municipality variation of the fixed effects models, we followed Ovington et al., 
(2017) and re-fitted our models including the Spanish regions (17 groups) as 
covariates.  
 
6. Results 
This section examines how local market competition and the sociodemographic 
characteristics of the municipalities affected Telefónica’s decision to deploy fiber. 
Recall that Telefónica was competing with cable operators and with other operators 
that relied on various regulated wholesale services to access their consumers. Taking 
this into account, we differentiate between three local competition categories, which 
14 
 
differ in terms of the operator’s reliance on the incumbent’s network: Cable, LLU and 
Bitstream.  
Table 2 reports the estimation results for four logit random effects models. In all the 
models, the dependent variable is fiber deployment, which takes a value of 1 for those 
periods and municipalities for which there is at least one fiber deployment and 0 
otherwise. Moreover, all models include the lagged competition and 
sociodemographic variables as explanatory variables. Model 1 does not include the 
regional dummies whilst Model 2 does.  
Note that many of the Spanish municipalities are extremely small, making them very 
unattractive investment objectives. Hence, for robustness, Models 3 and 4 are the re-
fits of Models 1 and 2, respectively, excluding municipalities with less than 1,000 
inhabitants. Although sample size in Models 3 and 4 is reduced by almost 50%, the 
results are highly consistent with those obtained when using all the municipalities.  
We first consider the impact that the presence of the different types of competitor had 
on Telefónica’s investment strategy. Table 2 shows that the effect of local loop 
unbundling on Telefónica FTTH deployment was positive and statistically significant in 
all the models. Thus, as the market share of LLU competitors increased by 1%, the 
probability of fiber deployment in the municipality grew by 12-14%
10
. It should be 
stressed at this juncture that this type of operator had been Telefónica’s fiercest 
competitors since the liberalization of the market at the end of the nineties, and that 
they managed to attract a large number of customers thanks to their low prices and 
differentiated service. However, in this period, xDSL operators did not develop their 
own fiber networks. Additionally, there were no wholesale services (regulated or 
otherwise) supporting an indirect mechanism for the provision of high quality end 
services. In the best case, existing wholesale services based on the copper network 
were only able to support broadband offers with a maximum speed of 30 Mbps, which 
is much slower than the speeds that can be provided with NGA networks. Thus, by 
deploying FTTH in areas in which LLU was more prevalent, Telefónica managed to 
differentiate its offer from those of its xDSL competitors and to make some profits 
from its NGA investment. Note also that the wholesale revenues foregone by 
Telefónica for each new FTTH client that switched from an LLU competitor were 
relatively small, as the local loop tariff was low. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Note that as the probability of fiber deployment (Pi) is so low, the odds are similar to the probability 
and the odds ratio is similar to the probability ratio.  
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Table 2. Logit random-effects regression results for Telefónica’s fiber deployment in 
local markets 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
LLU 
11.426*** 
(2.557) 
13.243*** 
(3.085) 
10.982*** 
(2.913) 
11.833*** 
(3.515) 
Bitstream 
-19.556*** 
(6.925) 
-16.886** 
(7.368) 
-19.797*** 
(7.607) 
-18.913** 
(8.538) 
Cable 
7.853*** 
(2.659) 
5.217  
(3.266) 
8.495*** 
(2.868) 
3.431 
 (4.164) 
Unemployment 
-35.941*** 
(9.046) 
-35.151*** 
(11.066) 
-25.566*** 
(9.927) 
-26.601** 
(12.038) 
Elderly population 
-103.311*** 
(10.266) 
-98.758*** 
(11.945) 
-111.851*** 
(11.618) 
-117.911*** 
(14.857) 
Log Real estate units 
4.913*** 
(0.381) 
5.949*** 
(0.444) 
5.673*** 
(0.423) 
7.408*** 
(0.514) 
Log Density 
3.985*** 
(0.780) 
5.587*** 
(0.819) 
3.946*** 
(0.796) 
5.734*** 
(0.901) 
Log Density * Dec 2010 
-1.314* 
(0.694) 
-1.477** 
(0.737) 
-1.353* 
(0.729) 
-1.573* 
(0.812) 
Log Density * June 2011 
-2.642*** 
(0.726) 
-3.121*** 
(0.777) 
-2.606*** 
(0.760) 
-3.161*** 
(0.830) 
Log Density * Dec 2011 
-3.055*** 
(0.725) 
-3.727*** 
(0.770) 
-2.920*** 
(0.767) 
-3.625*** 
(0.833) 
Log Density * June 2012 
-3.149*** 
(0.729) 
-3.821*** 
(0.769) 
-3.052*** 
(0.776) 
-3.816*** 
(0.845) 
Log Density * Dec 2012 
-3.432*** 
(0.735) 
-4.151*** 
(0.771) 
-3.334*** 
(0.782) 
-4.194*** 
(0.849) 
Log Density * June 2013 
-3.027*** 
(0.741) 
-3.726*** 
(0.776) 
-2.936*** 
(0.787) 
-3.778*** 
(0.856) 
December 2010 
11.397** 
(5.286) 
12.807** 
(5.648) 
11.735** 
(5.536) 
13.682** 
(6.159) 
June 2011 
25.745*** 
(5.609) 
29.797*** 
(6.047) 
25.341*** 
(5.859) 
30.398*** 
(6.386) 
December 2011 
32.923*** 
(5.633) 
38.768*** 
(6.057) 
31.970*** 
(5.915) 
38.834*** 
(6.380) 
June 2012 
37.090*** 
(5.646) 
43.145*** 
(6.065) 
36.392*** 
(5.976) 
44.138*** 
(6.440) 
December 2012 
41.190*** 
(5.665) 
47.805*** 
(6.066) 
40.551*** 
(5.995) 
49.331*** 
(6.429) 
June 2013 
40.932*** 
(5.678) 
47.628*** 
(6.103) 
40.304*** 
(6.020) 
49.370*** 
(6.457) 
Regional dummies NO YES NO YES 
Sigma 11.723 12.450 11.825 13.241 
Observations 42,441 42,441 22,491 22,491 
 *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%*. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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In contrast, the effect of bitstream competition on fiber deployment is negative and 
statistically significant in all models. A 1% increase in the market share of bitstream 
operators results in a 16-18% reduction in the probability of fiber deployment.  
Entrants to Spain’s telecommunications markets had few options to compete 
aggressively with Telefónica when using copper-based bitstream wholesale services. 
The reason for this is two-fold: on the one hand, bitstream gave them little room to 
differentiate their product
11
; and on the other, their services had to be marketed at 
higher retail prices because bitstream wholesale prices were relatively high compared 
to LLU. The fact that competition was weaker in these municipalities and that 
Telefónica obtained larger wholesale revenues from its competitors reduced the 
incumbents’ incentives to roll-out fiber. In summary, compared to LLU, the additional 
rents that the company could obtain as a result of service differentiation were smaller 
and the wholesale revenue reduction was larger. 
Evidence regarding cable competition is not as conclusive as that for LLU and 
bitstream. Models 1 and 3 show that the cable market share has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on fiber deployment, suggesting that Telefónica invested 
in this technology in municipalities where competition from cable operators was 
intensive. Yet, when we include regional effects in Models 2 and 4, we no longer find a 
statistically significant association between Telefónica’s fiber deployment and the 
cable market share, although in Model 2 the coefficient is almost significant at the 10% 
level (p-value of 0.110). Additionally, the positive effect of cable on fiber deployment is 
smaller than that of LLU in all models. Clearly, fiber roll-out was used as a product 
differentiation mechanism in the face of competition from LLU entrants, whilst this 
differentiation effect appears as less marked in the case of the stronger presence of 
cable companies.   
Interestingly, the results of our empirical model are similar to those obtained by 
Bourreau et al., (2017) in France, where the authors report a positive and significant 
effect of both the number of LLU entrants in a municipality on fiber deployment and 
the presence of the French cable operator on fiber roll-out. However, they do not 
provide any results regarding the effects of bitstream on fiber deployment. However, 
our results contrast with those of Briglauer et al., (2013), who report a negative joint 
impact of LLU and bitstream on fiber deployment. This paper, though, uses EU-national 
level data and does not distinguish between the individual effects of LLU and 
bitstream. One novelty of our paper is that we are able to examine the separate 
                                                          
11
 The main difference between LLU and bitstream access is the provisioning of one of the main network 
elements, namely the digital subscriber line access multiplexer or DSLAM. In the case of LLU, the DSLAM 
is always operated by the new market entrant, whereas in the case of bitstream access, the DSLAM is 
operated by the incumbent. As the incumbent operates the DSLAM, the new entrant is technically 
unable to alter the xDSL access link (towards the customer) and, so, opportunities for service 
differentiation are reduced.  
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effects of these two competition modes, and we find that they generate opposite 
effects
12
. 
Finally, turning to the sociodemographic characteristic of the municipalities, we 
observe that all the coefficients of the variables included in the four models have the 
expected sign and are strongly significant. Market size, measured by the logarithm of 
the number of households and offices in the municipality, has a positive effect on fiber 
deployment. Similarly, the coefficient of the variable Log Density is positive and 
statistically significant and the negative and increasing coefficients of the interaction 
between density and time show that with time Telefónica is more likely to roll-out 
fiber in less densely populated areas.  
These two results confirm the relevance of scale in the deployment of FTTH, and are 
essential for identifying the municipalities in which the public authorities need to 
intervene to guarantee the development of the service.  
Unemployment is included in the model as a proxy for income and willingness to pay. 
The results show that as the level of unemployment increases, the probability of fiber 
deployment in a municipality diminishes substantially. Thus, in the models, a 1% 
increase in the unemployment rate results in a 23-30% reduction in the probability of 
fiber deployment. Finally, the variable Elderly population, which reports the lagged 
value of the proportion of population aged 65 or more, has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on the deployment of fiber. As reported in previous studies of the 
digital divide in Spain, the elderly are the segment of population least likely to adopt 
new technologies due to such factors as learning and physical obstacles (García-
Mariñoso and Suárez, 2013). In line with these reports, we find that in municipalities 
with a greater proportion of elderly inhabitants, Telefónica was less likely to invest in 
fiber deployment. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the fiber deployment undertaken by Telefónica in Spain 
between 2010 and 2013, a period in which the incumbent was the only operator in the 
country to invest in this technology. Our first contribution has been to show that the 
regulation of access to Telefónica’s legacy and NGA networks has played an especially 
relevant role in the operator’s investment strategy. During this period, Telefónica 
focused its investment in those municipalities in which LLU competition was most 
                                                          
12
Another difference between our analysis and studies based on data from various countries is that, as 
we focus on one specific country, our LLU and bitstream coefficients isolate competition effects and do 
not reflect any regulatory variations.  
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intense and, to a lesser extent, in those in which cable operators enjoyed a large 
presence. In contrast, the firm’s level of investment was comparatively smaller in 
municipalities with bitstream entry. These findings suggest that Telefónica’s strategy 
for deploying fiber was mainly influenced by i) the objective of differentiating its offer 
from those of its competitors; ii) the intensity of competition of the different access 
modes; and, iii) the wholesale revenues foregone as a consequence of its investments.  
LLU competition provided a strong initial incentive for fiber deployment. In the wake of 
the intensive investment episode studied here, Telefónica’s competitors began to 
deploy their own fiber networks, often by means of co-investment plans with each 
other or with Telefónica. As a result, by December 2016, the number of FTTH accesses 
deployed had almost increased eightfold since June 2013. All of Spain’s leading 
operators have contributed to this process and by the end of 2016 Telefónica’s market 
share of FTTH access lines stood at 61.4%. Within Europe, Spain is the country with the 
third largest FTTH coverage, with 63% of households covered by July 2016, compared 
to a mean figure for the EU of 24%
13
.  Our second contribution has been to show how 
the sociodemographic characteristics of the municipalities affect Telefónica’s 
investment decisions. We have shown that market size and the density of population 
have a positive effect on fiber deployment, whilst the level of unemployment and the 
percentage of elderly population have a negative effect. In the context of a liberalized 
market, the adoption of a new technology by private operators will clearly depend on 
the profitability of the investment. This is an aspect that needs to be accounted for in 
the future design of the regulatory model for the telecommunications sector.   
In 2016, the Spanish authority modified sector regulation in recognition of the 
different levels of competition at the municipal level. In its review of broadband 
wholesale markets, the CNMC introduced separate geographical remedies. Thus, 66 
municipalities were designated as “competitive” as regards their NGA networks, being 
served by at least three operators, each providing a minimum of 20% local coverage. In 
these municipalities, the CNMC deemed it unnecessary to regulate residential NGA 
wholesale services. In contrast, in the “non-competitive” municipalities, Telefónica was 
required to offer a virtual access service to its FTTH accesses, and an indirect wholesale 
access service was established to its fiber network14. In the coming years, it will be 
extremely important to study the impact of these interventions on fiber deployment 
and competition. 
In 2016, the European Commission, aware of the risks resulting from insufficient 
investment in the sector, also proposed introducing a new Directive to establish a 
European Electronic Communications Code. This includes several proposals aimed at 
                                                          
13
 For the FTTH market share, see CNMC’s quarterly data at data.cnmc.es. The source for the household 
coverage is the EC’s Europe’s Digital Progress Report, 2016. 
14
 This reform eliminated the 30 Mbps limit for access to Telefónica’s network.  
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boosting investment in high capacity networks. For example, the Directive outlines a 
route for unregulated network expansions when those are based on co-investment 
agreements and for the removal of the regulation of wholesale offers of vertically 
separated companies. The current debate is whether such regulatory forbearance may 
have a detrimental impact on competition in the sector. Indeed, this is a key issue, as 
our results show that competition and product differentiation are essential to spur 
network investment.  
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